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Abstract In this article, we argue that firms in high-
margin industries can benefit from founding family
influence. Specifically, in more profitable markets,
the influence of the founding family provides an
additional corporate governance-monitoring function.
The sample consists of 294 firm-year observations
from 98 publicly traded companies headquartered in
Sweden, representing approximately half of all non-
financial traded firms. Our support that the effect of
family leadership in publicly held firms should be
assessed in relation to the intensity of industry
competition.
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1 Introduction
When thinking of family businesses, many think of
‘‘mom and pop’’ operations in low-profit margin
industries. This is a misnomer. Many family busi-
nesses are of considerable size and many are publicly
traded in high-profit margin industries such as
branded foods (e.g., Cadbury from the U.K.), fashion
(e.g., Ermenegildo Zegna from Italy), and publishing
(e.g., Washington Post from the U.S.). As such, these
publicly traded founding family firms are major
contributors to global economies (La Porta et al.
1999). Although founding family governance is the
norm, rather than the exception, in publicly traded
firms in Continental Europe and Asia (Becht and
Mayer 2001; La Porta et al. 1999; Morck and
Nakamura 1999), family leadership and ownership
influence has been under-studied in the management
and finance literatures (Steier et al. 2004).1 In this
research, we investigate how the relationship between
founding family leadership and firm performance is
contingent on the competitive nature of the industry.
Research on founding family leadership has mostly
focused on the realm of privately held entrepreneurial
and small- and medium-sized businesses (Fletcher
2002; Schulze et al. 2003). Those studies that have
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focused on founding family leadership in publicly
traded firms find evidence of a positive performance
effect (e.g., Anderson and Reeb 2003a; Barontini and
Capri 2006; McConaughy et al. 2001; Mishra et al.
2001). In other studies, family leadership has been
linked to lower performance (e.g., Claessens et al.
2002; Morck et al. 2000; Perez-Gonzales 2001; Smith
and Amoako-Adu 1999) or unchanged performance
(Jayaraman et al. 2000). Generally, researchers have
focused on firm-specific corporate governance drivers
and not on how industry profitability impacts, or is
impacted by, founding family leadership. We are
interested in exploring the competitive effectiveness of
publicly held family-led firms under the different
levels of industry competition and the resulting
industry profit margins. Specifically, are assumptions
of family-led performance superiority evident across
varying levels of industry profitability?
The study contributes to the literature in three
major respects. First, the study contributes to theory
development by explicitly suggesting that the perfor-
mance effect of founding family leadership in
publicly held firms should be assessed in relation to
industry profit margins. Our overarching theoretical
argument is that founding family leadership has a
positive influence in less competitive industries,
whereas the opposite is true for industries with high
competition. We assert that the monitoring effects of
founding family leadership can become a liability
when the firm is already ‘‘monitored’’ by a highly
competitive industry. Second, we make an empirical
contribution, in that, although past research has
conceptually acknowledged the importance of indus-
try profit margins associated with the extent of
competition within an industry (e.g., Allen and Gale
2000; Mayer 1997), few studies have conducted
empirical research on this issue. Third, as an
increasing number of firms are turning to stock
markets in order to broaden their strategic options
and support entrepreneurial growth (Ravasi and
Marchisio 2003), focusing our lens on family-led
firms that are publicly traded provides valuable
insights for family leaders interested in pursuing
growth through public offering.
The article proceeds as follows. We begin with a
review of the literature on the influence of family
leadership in publicly held firms. We proceed to
formulate the propositions investigating the relation-
ship between the founding family leadership in
publicly held firms, industry competition (i.e., levels
of industry profit margins), and firm performance. We
next describe the methodology and the research
setting, Swedish publicly held firms. The empirical
results and interpretation are presented, followed by a
summary of the key findings and suggested theoret-
ical and managerial implications.
2 Literature review
The goal structure within all family businesses,
whether private or public, can be inherently con-
flicted. The need to balance between a family’s goals
(e.g., the accumulation of personal and family
wealth) and the well-being of family participants
means that family businesses operate in a unique
corporate governance environment (Anderson and
Reeb 2004; Cowling 2003; McMahon 2004; Steier
et al. 2004; Randøy and Goel 2003).
The introduction of shareholder groups beyond the
family gives rise to disparate demands. Leaderships’
focus of attention is divided as they are forced to attend
to diverse sets of goals simultaneously (Connolly et al.
1980). However, founding-family ownership benefits
in publicly traded firms have been found to outweigh
the cost (Anderson and Reeb 2003a 2003b). Ideally, the
board is structured to ensure that the family directors’
interests are balanced by the independent directors’
objectivity (Anderson and Reeb 2004). Founding
family leadership often transcends generations as
family shareholders tend to have their wealth invested,
and serve as executives, in the firm (Mackie 2001).
Conflicts arise when the power wielded by the
influencing family enables them to pursue the family’s
interest to the detriment of the firm or other sharehold-
ers (Allen and Panian 1982; Demsetz and Lehn 1985).
In these situations, founding families are in an
exceptional position to pursue their interests through,
for example, control of cash within the firm (Dittmar
et al. 2003), distribution of profits (Anderson and Reeb
2003b), workplace inefficiencies due to family nepo-
tism (Burkhart et al. 1997; Burkhart et al. 2003), and
decisions regarding resource allocation (Densetz and
Lehn 1985).
In the extant literature, management and organiza-
tion researchers have focused on firm-specific
corporate governance mechanisms (such as the number
of board members, reporting and performance policy,
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board structure and skill sets, and timing of the
appointment of outside directors and chairs) when
investigating the influence of founding families in
publicly traded family firms (Anderson and Reeb
2004). The economic literature, however, suggests that
competition is also a very powerful force for ensuring
good corporate governance (e.g., Alchian 1950; Stigler
1958). Previous corporate governance research indi-
cates that industry competition may reduce the
potential for managerial expropriation (Shleifer and
Vishny 1997; Hart 1983). Variations in industry
structures (i.e., monopolistic versus more competitive
industry structures) may provide different needs and
rewards for founding family leaders in closely held
firms, linking the relationship between family leader-
ship and performance (Schulze et al. 2003).
In publicly held family led-firms, founding families
represent a special class of large shareholders that
contributes to a distinctive governance environment, as
a consequence of their unique incentive structures, a
strong voice in the firm, and powerful motives
(Anderson et al. 2003). Therefore, as the family is
likely to be more vested in the firm’s long-term survival
and more associated with the firm’s reputation (Ander-
son et al. 2003; Demsetz and Lehn 1985), family can
be a potential provider of more useful resources and a
possible enhancement of the firm (Filatochev and
Bishop 2002). A family-influenced governance envi-
ronment can lead to better monitoring of management
discretion and reduce principal-agent costs associated
with diffused share ownership structures (Filatochev
et al. 2005). In firms where monitoring requires
knowledge and information about firm technology
and processes, families potentially provide superior
oversight because of their lengthy involvement with
the firm (Anderson and Reeb 2003).
We argue, therefore, that firms in industries with
monopolistic/oligopolistic industry structures (i.e.,
less competitive with higher industry profit margins)
can benefit from founding family leadership. In such
highly profitable markets, the founding family lead-
ership provides an important corporate governance-
monitoring function. As a consequence, in these
highly profitable industries, founding family leader-
ship positively affects firm value and profitability.
Proposition 1 Founding family leadership posi-
tively affects firm value and profitability in firms
operating in high-margin industries.
Firms operating in highly competitive industries
(i.e., low industry profit margins) may not be as able
to benefit from founding family leadership. In these
firms, founding family leadership can even become a
liability, as closely held firms controlled by families
can be less growth-oriented, less risk-taking, and
potentially more vulnerable to decision-making iner-
tia (e.g., Chandler 1990). We argue that the
governance structures of a family-influenced firm
(e.g., incentive structures) enhance firm performance
and reinforce competitiveness in high-margin indus-
tries, but act as a constraint in more competitive, low-
margin industries. Specifically, we posit that firms
which are unhindered by founder and family influ-
ence are more capable of reacting to the dynamic
needs associated with highly competitive industries.
Proposition 2 Founding family leadership nega-
tively affects firm value and profitability among firms
operating in low-margin industries.
3 Data and methodology
The sample consists of 294 firm-year observations
from 98 publicly traded companies headquartered in
Sweden. Sweden represents a particularly attractive
environment to test the main propositions of this
article. First, relatively large shares of public firms in
Sweden have founding family influence (22.5% in
our sample). Second, Sweden has one of Europe’s
largest stock market capitalizations—relative to the
size of the economy, which is also true for market
turnover, an indication of a liquid and active stock
market. Third, the relatively high degree of transpar-
ency of Swedish publicly traded firms, unlike in other
European capital markets as highlighted by authors
such as La Porta et al. 1999, makes it possible to
access reliable firm-specific information (such as the
nature of family influence, their direct and indirect
ownership positions, board independence etc.).
The sample represents approximately one-third of
all traded firms in Sweden during the sample period
(1996–1998). The advantage of using data from 1996
to 1998 is that the performance variables are less
affected by the 1999–2001 stock-market bubble—
which was significant in Sweden. Since Sweden
imposes legal limitations on founding family leader-
ship in finance, banking, and insurance, we chose to
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exclude financial industries. This implies that almost
half of all non-financial publicly traded firms are
included in our sample. We collected data from an
initial random sample of 120 traded Swedish firms,
from which we were able to collect complete infor-
mation from 98 companies. The missing data were due
to companies using unusual reporting periods (seven
firms), companies being listed for less than 2 years
(five firms), infrequent trading of stock (two firms), and
eight missing cases due to incomplete information. The
actual sample that satisfied our sample criteria was 108
firms, whereas the non-response (incomplete informa-
tion and infrequent trading) was 10 firms, or
approximately 9%. The sample characteristics, in
terms of size and industry, do suggest that our sample
is representative for all Swedish publicly traded non-
financial firms during the study period.
For all firms we collected secondary data from
annual reports and other sources of corporate gover-
nance information (such as Sundqvist 1999). Since
information on several of the corporate governance
variables—such as board independence, firm age, and
founding family leadership—was not available (or
only partly so) through secondary sources, we applied
phone interviews with fax follow-ups to identify
these variables. Supplementing secondary data with
information from primary sources added to the
richness of our data collection, however, with the
slight drawback that we had to exclude 9% of our
sample firms due to non-response.
3.1 Control variables
Past research has identified a variety of variables as
potentially affecting the performance of founding
family leadership (cf. Jayaraman et al. 2000 for a
comprehensive review). Previous results may be
irrelevant, as they may deteriorate or even disappear
when other relevant determinants of performance (for
example, blockholder ownership) are considered
simultaneously in the analysis. In particular, support
has been indicated for the importance of ownership
structure (Thomsen and Pedersen 2000), debt pres-
sure (Jensen 1989; Bathala and Rao 1995), firm age
(Smith et al. 1985), firm size (Dalton et al. 1999), and
industry (Baysinger and Butler 1985). Consequently,
the effects these variables might have on the
relationships of interest were diminished by including
them as control variables in the model.
3.2 Measures
We used two measures for firm performance (the
dependent variable): firm value and lagged profitabil-
ity. Firm value is measured by a firm’s market-to-book
value of equity at December 31, in 1996, 1997, and
1998. For firm profitability, we chose to apply a 1-year
delayed return on assets (ROA), as accounting num-
bers do not reflect performance changes as rapidly as
changes in stock market capitalization. ROA is calcu-
lated by using the last year’s net profits (before interest,
tax, and exceptional items) divided by the average
book value of assets for 1996, 1997, and 1998.
Industry profit margin is measured by using a 2-year
moving average profit margin for 19 industry groups
(the industry groups were assigned by Stockholm Stock
Exchange). We calculated profit margins by using
yearly operating income before interest, taxes and
exceptional items, divided by yearly sales (i.e., Industry
average ROS). Most studies of industry competition use
structural indicators, such as the N-firm concentration or
the Herfindahl index. However, we argue that a long-
term outcome-based variable (i.e., industry profit mar-
gins) has more relevance to corporate governance than a
market structure indicator. Under the condition of
Cournot oligopolic competition, the industrial organi-
zation theory predicts a positive association between
profit margins and market structure (Conyon and
Machin 1991). Furthermore, a number of empirical
studies, such as Collins and Preston (1969) and Karier
(1994), verify a significant relationship between market
power and industry profit margins.
Founding family leadership, defined to include the
founder and his/her descendants, was recorded as a
binary variable that equals 1 if the firm has a
founding family CEO or Chair, 0 otherwise. While
both CEO and Chairperson are important leadership
positions, unlike the U.S., CEO-Chair duality is not
allowed in Sweden, so a single person (e.g., a
founder) cannot occupy both positions. Of course,
second generation founding family firms, or firms
with multiple founders, can choose to fill both
positions with members of the founding family. We
therefore find it appropriate to combine the two forms
of founding family leadership (CEO or Chair), as we
see both positions as indicative of a founding family’s
influence in corporate leadership.
Founding family ownership is the percentage of all
classes of shares owned by the founder, or his or her
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descendents. Blockholder ownership is the percentage
of all shares that are owned by the three largest
shareholders.2 Debt ratio is the ratio of total liabilities
to total assets. Firm age is not normally distributed and
so is measured by the natural logarithm of the number
of years between the observation year and the firm’s
founding year. Firm size was measured using total
revenues for each year translated into Swedish cur-
rency (SEK). As the revenue variable was not normally
distributed, we again used the natural logarithm.
Likewise, Board independence is the percentage of
independent outside directors on the board. An
outside director is defined as someone who is not,
and has not been, directly or indirectly employed by
the firm, either as an employee or as a manager. We
have not been able to separate out independent
directors with other commercial ties with the firm,
commonly referred to as ‘‘gray’’ directors. Given the
fact that Sweden is generally considered to be low on
measures of corruption, and the fact that we are only
using board independence as a control variable,
suggests that this should only be a minor problem.
Swedish law requires that firms with more than 500
employees reserve two board seats for employee
representatives. The measure of board independence
excludes these board members (from both the
denominator and the numerator), such that the 500
employees cut-off does not affect the measure of
board independence.
4 Data analysis
We use a two-way fixed effects pooled cross-
sectional ordinary least-square (OLS) regression
model to test the propositions presented in the
preceding section. The fixed effect is a dummy
variable for each sample year. Drawing on previous
research on corporate governance, the model
includes critical control variables, including corpo-
rate governance variables and general firm
characteristics and industry (represented by the
average ROA of industry groups) identifiers to
minimize specification bias in the proposition test-
ing. The model used to test the relation between
founding family firm leadership and firm value
(market-to-book), as well as delayed profitability
(ROA) is shown below.
We used two analytical approaches; one using the
regression model with the moderated effects (Table 2)
and one with a split sample model (Table 1). Due to the
predicted non-linear relationship between founding
family leadership, industry profit margins, and firm
performance, it was unproductive to test the effect of
founding family leadership with a simple interaction
variable (i.e., a linear effect). Therefore, we performed
piece-wise OLS regression that measured the effect of
founding family leadership at two different levels of
industry profit margins. In the test shown in Table 2, we
produced an interaction dummy for the existence of
high/low level of industry profit margins and the
presence of founding family leadership. We differenti-
ated the effects of founding family leadership among
firms at the bottom 25 percentile in terms of average
industry profit margin (highly competitive industries),
and top 25 percentile (least competitive industries).
Even though the 25 percentile is arbitrary, the results do
not change significantly if the cut-off is set at the 33
percentile. In Table 1, we apply an alternative approach
to address the non-linearity issue, by using a split-
sample method. Of course, this approach also provides
some limitations, as we are only comparing firms within
Firm Performance ¼ aþ b1*Founding Family Leadership (at various levels of industry profit margin)
þ b2*Industry ROS þ b3*Founding Family Ownership þ b4*Blockholder Ownership
þ b5*Debt Ratio þ b6*Firm Age þ b7*Firm Size þ b8*Board Independence
2 A potential weakness of family business research is the lack
of distinction between family ownership and blockholder
ownership. There is naturally a level of overlap between the
two—as any block of family ownership also is a blockholder.
However, most blockholders are not family owners in this
study—as shown by the fact that the correlation between the
two concepts is 0.417. This also implies that the two concepts
of ownership are sufficiently independent that they can be put
in the same regression model.
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one bracket of industry profitability (high-, moderate-,
and low-profit margin industries).
5 Results
Table 3 shows the correlations between the variables
in this study, as well as descriptive statistics. None of
the correlation coefficients rise to a level suggestive
of collinearity. Founding family leadership shows a
significant positive correlation (r = 0.12; P \ .05)
with firm value, but not with delayed profitability
(r = 0.02; P [ .05). Four of the five control variables
are significantly correlated with firm value and two
with delayed profitability, which suggests that a
multivariate model is highly appropriate.
The analysis of residuals did not indicate any
problems with either heteroscedasticity or non-nor-
mal distributions. To give the strongest possible test
of the effects of founding family leadership, separate
Table 1 Founding family leadership, and the moderating effect of industry profit margins: split sample regressions
Sub-samples based
on industry
competitiveness
Low margin/highly competitive
industries
Moderately competitive industries High margin/less competitive
industries
Dependent
variable:
market-to-
book
Dependent
variable: ROA
delayed 1 year
Dependent
variable:
market-to-
book
Dependent
variable: ROA
delayed one year
Dependent
variable:
market-to-
book
Dependent
variable: ROA
delayed one year
Predicted effect of
founding family
CEO or Chair
+ + - -
Founding family
CEO or Chair
-.241
(-1.766)
-.037
(-.39)
.416
(2.54)*
-.037
(-.35)
.280
(2.17)*
.226
(2.22)*
Control variables
Industry ROS .152
(1.77)
-.299
(-3.35)**
.024
(.24)
-.205
(-1.95)
-.610
(-5.14)***
-.316
(-2.48)*
Founding family
ownership
-.054
(-.81)
-.024
(-.38)
-.081
(-1.16)
-.101
(-1.55)
-.097
(-1.43)
-.123
(-1.97)*
Blockholder
ownership
.160
(1.83)
.397
(4.32)***
-.359
(-2.98)**
.130
(1.98)
.276
(3.10)**
.126
(1.31)
Debt ratio -.216
(-2.56)*
-.016
(-.18)
-.198
(-1.62)
-.414
(-3.35)**
-.010
(-.08)
-.228
(-1.72)
Firm age (ln) -.521
(-5.70)***
.015
(.16)
-.027
(-.218)
.037
(.30)
-.022
(-.21)
.082
(.71)
Firm size (ln) .007
(.07)
.443
(4.63)***
.046
(.35)
.215
(1.61)
.049
(.44)
.071
(.60)
Board independence -.195
(-2.03)*
-.038
(-.380)
-.250
(-2.15)*
.216
(1.95)
.230
(2.19)*
-.112
(-1.34)
Number of
observations (firm-
years)
117 117 90 90 87 87
Adjusted R-square 0.305 0.240 0.148 0.125 0.407 0.315
F-Statistics
(Significance)
8.268*** 6.237*** 3.212** 2.809* 9.420*** 6.652***
Standardized beta values reported and t-values in parentheses
 P \ .10 (two-tailed)
* P \ .05 (two-tailed)
** P \ .01 (two-tailed)
*** P \ .001 (two-tailed)
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Table 2 Founder leadership, firm performance, and the moderating effect of industry profit margins
Predicted
effects
Control variables only Control variables and main
effects
Full model
Dependent
variable:
market-to-
book
Dependent
variable: ROA
delayed one year
Dependent
variable:
market-to-
book
Dependent
variable: ROA
delayed one year
Dependent
variable:
market-to-
book
Dependent
variable: ROA
delayed one year
Founding family CEO or Chair in:
Highly
competitive
industries
– -.076
(-.76)
.105
(.99)
Moderately
competitive
industries
.092
(1.04)
.166
(1.76)
Least competitive
industries
+ .188
(2.19)*
.265
(2.90)**
Main effects
Founding family
CEO or Chair
.123
(1.56)
.163
(1.95)
.015
(.10)
-.120
(-.78)
Industry ROS .044
(.65)
-.173
(-2.42)*
-.050
(-.70)
-.253
(-3.34)**
Control variables
Founding family
ownership
-.058
(-.95)
-.049
(-.75)
-.138
(-1.75)
-.150
(-1.79)
-.149
(-1.90)
-.154
(-1.85)
Blockholder
ownership
-.043
(-.72)
.208
(3.22)**
-.051
(-.83)
.238
(3.66)***
-.032
(-.53)
.260
(4.03)***
Debt ratio -.084
(-1.48)
-.225
(-3.70)***
-.091
(-1.57)
-.191
(-3.11)**
-.063
(-1.08)
-.149
(-2.38)*
Firm age -.178
(-2.99)**
.004
(.21)
-.161
(-2.68)**
.049
(.76)
-.221
(-3.37)**
.027
(.41)
Firm size .093
(1.47)
.236
(3.50)**
.085
(1.35)
.215
(3.21)**
.103
(1.65)
.232
(3.49)**
Board
independence
-.141
(-2.60)*
.012
(.21)
-.127
(-2.19)*
.080
(1.30)
-.178
(-2.99)**
.023
(.37)
Number of
observations
(firm-years)
294 294 294 294 294 294
R-square .264 .151 .271 .179 .305 .208
Change R-square
over model to
the left
.007 .029 .034 .028
F-Statistics
(Significance)
9.189*** 4.551*** 8.019*** 4.706*** 7.597*** 4.541***
F-Statistics
(Significance)
over model to
the left
1.427 4.871** 4.474** 3.319*
Standardized beta values reported and t-values are in parentheses
 P \ .10 (two-tailed)
* P \ .05 (two-tailed)
** P \ .01 (two-tailed)
*** P \ .001 (two-tailed)
Founding family leadership and industry profitability 403
123
regressions are performed with (Model 1) and
without (Model 2) the founding family firm owner-
ship variable. The results indicate that leaving out the
founding family ownership variable does not signif-
icantly change the results. Furthermore, the Variance
Inflation Factor (VIF) statistics (\10) does not
indicate any other multicollinearity concerns (Hair
et al. 1995).
The correlations matrix reveals that there is a
negative correlation between industry profit margins
and firm performance. Based on Industrial Econom-
ics (e.g., McGahan and Porter 1997), one would
expect to see a positive effect. We argue that much of
this effect is due to the other variables, which is
shown through the multivariate test in Table 2. This
effect is insignificant for the market-to-book measure.
However, the negative effect of industry profitability
could be explained by mean reversion, as highly
profitable industries (based on our two year moving
average measure) subsequently are moving toward
‘‘normal’’ profitability the following year (as our
research design incorporated a one year lag measure
of profitability).
The regression estimates of our model appear in
Table 2. The results indicate that industry profit
margin has a significant moderating effect on firm
value and profitability. The effects of founding family
leadership are contingent on the level of industry
profit margins.
As predicted, founding family leadership affects
firm value positively among firms that face a high
margin industry. Thus, Proposition 1 is supported.
This relationship proves robust for both our measures
of firm performance. Our findings suggest that
founding family leadership can be an efficient
corporate governance role, as proposed by Fama
and Jensen (1983), and Anderson and Reeb (2003b).
We failed to identify a significant negative effect of
founding family leadership among firms in low-
margin industries, as shown in Table 2. Thus, Prop-
osition 2 is not supported.
6 Discussion and conclusion
Whereas previous investigations into founding firm
leadership have concentrated on firm corporate
governance mechanisms, such as financial incentives
and CEO hiring/dismissal policy, in this research, we
focused our attention on the industry profit margins
where the firm resides. This line of inquiry is
important, as, contrary to many assumptions, publicly
traded predominantly family-owned firms have a
major impact on all economies. The stated purpose of
our study was to investigate whether the relationship
between founding family leadership and firm perfor-
mance is contingent on the competitive nature of the
industry. Our results lead to several observations.
Table 3 Pearson correlation matrix and descriptive statistics
Variables Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1. Firm value (market-
to-book)
2.250 2.029
2. Profitability (ROA
delayed one year)
.061 .074 .291**
3. Founding family
leadership
.225 .418 .124* .023
4. Founding family
ownership (%)
9.580 17.483 -.042 -.038 .694**
5. Blockholder
ownership (%)
42.429 20.00 -.174** .110 .205** .417**
6. Debt ratio .578 .149 -.153** -.140* -.032 -.015 .126*
7. Firm age (ln) 3.856 .837 -.123* .110 -.269** -.139* .004 .021
8. Firm size (ln) 7.657 1.768 .082 .228** -.217** -.295** -.159** .183** .415**
9. Industry ROS .0725 .0535 -.184** -.129* -.046 .029 .239** .331** -.040 -.118*
10. Board independence .083 .129 -.089 .068 -.306** -.178** .068 .030 .041 .166** .120*
* P \ .05 (two-tailed)
** P \ .01 (two-tailed)
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Founding family leadership enhances firm value
and profitability in higher-profit margin industries
due to the ongoing family influence. Our findings
are consistent with Anderson and Reeb (2003).
Family leadership of firms in these high-margin
industries is more capable of achieving greater
financial performance than non-family-managed
public firms, as family leaders exercise a greater
tacit understanding and knowledge of the core
business practices and processes in these industries.
In low-profit margin industries, our findings illus-
trate that family-led publicly traded firms do not
demonstrate a significant advantage over their
competitors in either firm valuation or profitability,
as illustrated in Table 2.
We suggest that the lack of a negative effect from
founding family leadership among firms in low-profit
margin industries, introduced in Proposition 2, can be
linked to the nature of the industry structure. We can
infer that non-family member managers are as
equipped as their family-member counterparts at
being agents for shareholders in highly competitive
markets that are rapidly changing.
Our findings have implications for decision makers
in publicly traded family firms. To thrive in more
competitive settings, publicly traded family firms
may need to adapt their ownership and governance
structures. Publicly traded family firms, when enter-
ing new, more competitive markets, should consider
adapting their governance mechanisms through the
introduction of external non-family directors, pursue
the inclusion of non-family capital, and broadening
managerial skill bases through hiring external non-
family professional managers to overcome the chal-
lenges associated with these lower-profit margin
industries.
These findings have wide implications for share-
holders. For example, shareholders need to consider
family firm motivations for entry to the public capital
market. Including in these motivations are the need to
raise additional capital for further growth in present
markets, to enter new markets, or to provide a
liquidity mechanism for family members (to trade
shares or to exit the family firm) (e.g., Anderson and
Reeb 2003b). Shareholders and institutional investors
should consider the founding family leadership, as
well as the industry profit margins when making
investment decisions. Our results indicate that pub-
licly traded firms in less competitive industries are
more attractive to investors than their non-family
competitors. This article affirms that shareholders
should consider the role of the industry profit margins
and founding family leadership as contributors to firm
financial valuation and profitability.
7 Limitations and future research
A primary concern of our results is linked to the
representativeness of our sample and the potentially
confounding effects of sample endogeneity. Specif-
ically, the overall representativeness of our findings
may fall short as family firms are more attracted to
high-profit margin industries and potentially avoid
entry in more competitive industries. Hence, the
sample may be over represented by family-led firms
in high-margin industries and under represented in
low-margin industries. We did attempt to mitigate
these effects through a random selection of respon-
dents, but we do acknowledge this point as a potential
limitation of our findings. Furthermore, by focusing
on publicly traded firms, which until recently did
require a history before being listed on the Stockholm
Stock Exchange, we see less of a problem with such
self-selection. In fact the median founding year of the
sample firm is 1951, the youngest established in 1996
and the oldest in 1759.
We also acknowledge the potential for limited
generalizability of our findings based on our Swedish
sample. In particular, we cautiously suggest that in
countries, where founders often hire professional
managers and where the vast majority of publicly
traded firms are not family-controlled (e.g., US), the
influence of family may not be as strong compared to
countries where family-led publicly traded firms are
more dominant (e.g., Western European and Asian
countries) (Burkart et al. 2003; La Porta et al. 1999).
Since the monitoring function of industry competi-
tion is based on general micro-economic mechanisms,
the impact of different levels of industry profit margins
on founding family leadership is suggested to be similar
in different countries. The policies of national compe-
tition authorities can, however, alter this effect. Our
focus is on the moderating impact of industry profit
margins on founding family leadership. Past research
advocates that corporate governance effectiveness is
moderated by specific institutional and cultural envi-
ronments (Gedajlovic and Shapiro 1998), such that our
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findings cannot automatically be extended to other
countries.
This article focuses on only one influence that
affects the effectiveness of founding family leader-
ship, namely, industry profit margins. Other studies
have addressed related issues—such as the moderat-
ing effect of board independence (Anderson and Reeb
2004) on the effectiveness of founding family
leadership. Future research needs to address other
demographic variables that interact with the effec-
tiveness of founding family leadership such as
ownership structure, incentive structure of top man-
agement, and board structure.
The focus of this article has been on the differ-
ences ‘‘between’’ family-led and non-family-led firms
in different competitive environments. Scholars
should consider, in the future, the factors or prevail-
ing conditions under which family-led firms compete
in both high and low competitive industries. In
essence, the ‘‘within’’ study of family-led firms would
provide a greater understanding of how these firms
compete and govern themselves in varying environ-
mental contexts.
Furthermore, we did not attempt to capture the
managerial motivations (e.g., why family-controlled
firms might actually explicitly ‘‘choose’’ or choose to
stay in) less competitive industries, which enable
them to keep a tighter control in terms of ownership
and governance (given the lower external pressures to
do otherwise) for competitive industry selection.
Future research should attempt to identify the specific
ways that industry profit margins affect firm behav-
ior—both among founding family firms and non-
founding family firms and the managerial motivations
for competitive industry selection.
Similarly, issues related to country-specific envi-
ronments might also influence industry entry options
(i.e., highly or less competitive). In advanced coun-
tries, for example, firms are faced with a more
competitive landscape: hence, family-led firms, with-
out choosing, may find themselves in a more fiercely
competitive setting. In less-developed countries, the
industry profit margins maybe higher and therefore
more conducive to family-led firms’ success than
those firms with non-family professional managers.
In conclusion, these findings support our basic
premise that founding family members do add value
to a firm’s competitive effectiveness and are capable
of successfully monitoring a firm’s activities in
higher-margin industries. When an industry is char-
acterized as being highly competitive with the
resulting low industry profit margins, the effective-
ness of founding family leadership is comparable to
non-family professional leadership.
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